After more than four years of negotiations, economic aid funding was approved under the Association Agreement, an agreement that governs the relationship between the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States. But will U.S. policymakers, diplomats, and lawmakers continue to focus on building relationships with these and other Pacific Island nations? Or will interest fade?
Renewing funding for the Compact is not an end in itself, especially as China pursues strategic objectives throughout the Pacific. Given the strategic environment, the United States cannot retreat from its continued focus on the Pacific islands.
good things
Since 2018, the United States has not only negotiated new funding for the three Freely Associated Nations under the Agreement, but has also worked with Australia, Japan and New Zealand to significantly expand electrification in Papua New Guinea and to upgrade Lombram Naval Base on Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island.
When the Biden administration took over the reins of Pacific island policy in 2021, it lit a fire under the field: It developed the first-ever Pacific island strategy, welcomed Pacific island leaders to the White House twice, renegotiated U.S. access to South Pacific tuna fisheries, agreed to defense cooperation with Papua New Guinea, opened two Pacific embassies and announced plans for two more.
Ultimately, $7.1 billion in new funding under the agreement was signed into law in March 2024.
In six years, the United States has gone from low-key to full-on involvement in the Pacific islands, but the journey has been bumpy.
bad person
Electrification in Papua New Guinea is moving at a snail’s pace, with some blaming the state-owned electricity company, PNG Power, and U.S. involvement in upgrading the Lombrum naval base appears to have evaporated.
The hastily concluded Papua New Guinea defense agreement has raised concerns about US intentions in the region, concerns not only of Papua New Guineans but Australians as well. During the talks, I learned from U.S. negotiators that Australian diplomats were trying to sabotage negotiations by casting doubt on Washington’s credibility. Americans wondered why Australians would do such a thing.
Later, in 2023, at a meeting held with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Papua New Guinea at the headquarters of the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, I witnessed confusion between the two parties. It became clear that poor communication within Papua New Guinea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the United States was contributing to negative perceptions. Fortunately, both parties were able to clarify the situation.
New embassies have opened in the Solomon Islands and Tonga, but those planned for Kiribati and Vanuatu have not opened. The biggest concern is the inability to open an embassy in Kiribati. Until now, Kiribati and the United States have had good relations, but the situation appears to have changed since Tarawa changed its One China recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Tarawa’s slow progress in opening a US embassy is worrying Washington. The Biden administration has a strained relationship with the Solomon Islands government, led by Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare. The United States proposed sending U.S. Peace Corps volunteers to the Solomon Islands in 2019, but the Sogavare administration did little to advance the plan. Honiara, like Tarawa, appears to be ignoring Washington’s entreaties.
Diplomatic turbulence is nothing new. Every new endeavor comes with growing pains, and some are just plain ugly.
Ugly
Every new U.S. spending announcement is accompanied by an asterisk that says it depends on Congressional appropriations. But too often no one notices it.
Both parties in Congress supported funding the Freely Associated Compact, but the bill still took months to pass. It was crippled by confusion over the role of the House speaker and repeated calls from Congress for cuts in other areas to offset the $7.1 billion. Leaders of the Freely Associated States questioned whether the U.S. was serious. Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine said relationships were “being slowly destroyed by partisan politics.”
Passage of this bill came only after extensive lobbying of members of Congress. This is concerning given the free involvement of these three countries in US defense planning in the Pacific. What are the prospects for further legislation?
what to do?
America’s foreign policy, policy making, and development assistance all depend on Congress. The House of Representatives holds the purse strings. Without buy-in and buy-in, funding will always be a problem.
The United States previously scaled back its involvement in the South Pacific to save money, leaving the region in the hands of Australia and New Zealand. The three countries did not have the same interests, but the differences were less important when the Pacific islands were not of strategic importance to Washington. But now they are on board, and the United States absolutely has to be involved and must continue to maintain that focus.
Congress cannot game the boat over funding for Pacific programs. Policymakers cannot allow existing, outdated programs to continue. Too much is at stake. The needs of the Pacific region must be better explained to the executive and legislative branches of government, especially the islands’ basic needs for health care, trade, and jobs. By addressing these needs, the United States can help both improve the lives of Pacific Islanders and build lasting friendships.
These bonds will help counter China’s malign strategic efforts in the region.
Alan Tidwell is Professor of Practice at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and Director of the Center for Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Studies.
This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and can be found in its original form here.
The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
