Last week, Russian forces opened a new front with the invasion of Ukraine.
Launching an offensive into the Kharkov region, Russian forces quickly advanced several kilometers and managed to reoccupy several villages liberated in a successful Ukrainian offensive in September 2022. The main defensive line in the eastern part of the Kharkiv region has not yet been reached. Brigades are better equipped and more experienced than brigades closer to the border. But the situation is serious.
By threatening Ukraine’s second most populous city, Russia hopes to lock Ukraine’s resources in the region and expose its front lines elsewhere. Ukraine’s immediate priority is to stabilize the front and prevent a major Russian breakthrough, which may be possible. However, it is dealing with a series of challenges that have been building up since last year, and won’t be resolved anytime soon. Despite the recent passage of an aid bill in parliament, allowing for billions of dollars in aid to Kiev, the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better.
Russia’s objective is not to occupy Kharkov, but to threaten it by marching towards it and threatening it with artillery. Russia lacks the troops to attack the city itself, but this operation is designed to create a dilemma. Ukraine’s military is already relatively thin. By drawing Ukrainian reserves and better forces to Kharkov’s defenses, the Russian offensive weakens other parts of the front. Russia remains focused on occupying the rest of the eastern Donetsk region, seeking to seize key transportation hubs and population centers.
In recent days, some Ukrainian military units have already been redeployed from Donetsk to Kharkov, and Ukraine appears to be deploying separate battalions to strengthen other parts of the front. This risks leaving Ukrainian forces in Donetsk even more vulnerable if Russia commits Donetsk reserves in that direction. Russian forces are also putting pressure on the eastern Kharkov suburb of Kupiansk and the southern Zaporizhzhya region. Invasions are likely to occur along the border between Sumy and Chernihiv regions.
The Russian attack came at a vulnerable time for Ukraine. Since last fall, the country has faced three interrelated problems: shortages of ammunition, personnel and fortifications. Ukraine has made progress in improving its fortifications over the spring, and an aid package from the United States should ease ammunition shortages. However, Ukraine’s human resources continue to deteriorate, especially in a critical section – the infantry.
Ukraine’s counterattack last summer culminated in mainly infantry attrition, and it has struggled to make up for its losses ever since. In practice, this means that there are often too few soldiers in the trenches, often not enough infantry to develop a sustainable rotation, and that there is a risk of attrition over time. . This also has the detrimental effect of discouraging others from volunteering. Many Ukrainian brigades are understaffed, with many soldiers over 40 years old.
Let me be clear: Ukraine does not lack talent. This situation is the result of policy choices, an unstable mobilization system, and months of political intransigence leading up to the recent passage of a series of mobilization laws. These laws sought to expand the pool of soldiers by lowering the draft eligibility age, punishing those who attempt to evade military service, allowing some prisoners to serve in the military, and providing incentives for volunteers. It is the purpose. They have promised to address Ukraine’s human resources issues, but much will depend on how they do so. In any case, it will take many months for the situation to improve.
Lacking sufficient troops and lacking ammunition, the Ukrainian military has responded to a Russian breakthrough by deploying elite brigades and elite units to the front lines. This firefighting that occurred during the battle between Bahmut and Avdiika means that the superior forces do not have enough time to rest and recover. Ukraine also relies on the gradual deployment of individual battalions to strengthen parts of the front without using the rest of the brigade. These are short-term solutions, but they have long-term effects as the unit deteriorates over time.
Russia, by contrast, managed to address its personnel problems last year and is now hiring about 30,000 contract military personnel a month. Many of these recruits are not ideal soldiers and are in their 40s. However, this physical superiority, combined with attacks by artillery, drones, and glide bombs, gave Russia a quantitative advantage.
However, Russia’s advantage is not necessarily decisive. The loss of military quality and leadership limits Russia’s ability to carry out large-scale operations. That is why the Russian military has struggled to turn advances into breakthroughs and has not been able to achieve greater results. Russia is also losing equipment, much of it from storage, and will face a shortage in 2025.
Even with the passage of the US aid bill, Ukraine faces a difficult year. American aid bought Ukraine time and provided certainty about available resources. This funding could be enough for Ukraine to maintain and, in the best case, restore its military’s offensive capabilities. It provides an opportunity. But the future depends on how the West (which plays a key role in training, intelligence and other support) and Ukraine can leverage it.
If Ukraine is able to contain Russia’s modest gains this year, Russia’s window of opportunity could close and its relative advantage could begin to decline in 2025. This is not just a matter of Ukraine acquiring ammunition and weapons from Western countries, but also managing its armed forces effectively, addressing long-term human resource shortages, and establishing adequate defenses. Ukraine must defend itself while at the same time working to reorganize its military. Much is at stake in the coming months.
