Elections under a regime like Tehran’s are neither free nor fair, but this vote is important. It will have an impact on the long-term survival of the Islamic Republic at a time of deep domestic and regional turmoil. Today’s clerical system is facing widespread discontent among the population, in part due to a worsening economy, and the clerical system is fueling the fire with its violent and repressive response to those who challenge it.
If a majority of Iranians do not vote, then those who advocate the country’s most closed-minded and regressive tendencies will continue to rule unabated — but they will do so without even a pretense of national legitimacy. But if large numbers of people turn out to vote, the story becomes more complicated.
Although presidential elections are meticulously planned, they have historically been the only opportunity for Iranians to influence the government’s decision-making. As a result, Iranian elections have often produced unexpected results.
And in Iran’s presidential elections, Iranians voted in large numbers for a so-called reformist candidate who advocated opening up to foreign investment, better relations with the world, and loosening social restrictions. It is important to remember that reformers are not trying to overthrow the Islamic Republic; through reforms they are trying to prolong its existence.
In 2013, for example, many observers were sure that hard-line Iranian President Jalili would win. He ran again and was the supreme leader’s choice to succeed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But many people, whose living standards had plummeted after U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil exports were imposed in 2012, were not so sure. Many vowed never to vote again, but as the election drew near, they supported cleric Hassan Rouhani, who promised engagement with the West as a way to lift sanctions that were crippling the Iranian economy. Rouhani’s campaign made good use of social media, and many of his proposed cabinet members were Western-educated. Rouhani’s momentum grew quickly.
Rouhani won a surprising but overwhelming victory, receiving the majority of votes among six candidates. Jalili came in third in that election. Qalibaf, another candidate this year, finished second in 2013.
Will history repeat itself for the reformed Pezeshkian?
A lot has changed in the decade since then, but living standards are worse than they were then. Pezeshkian has promised new ties with the West and relaxed social restrictions. He has particularly questioned the wisdom of strict enforcement of the hijab requirement for women. It is unclear how he will achieve these goals. But former President Mohammed Khatami supports him, and Rouhani’s foreign minister, Mohammed Javad Zarif, who was educated in the United States, is advising his election campaign.
In response to pressure from the United States and other outside powers, Jalili has argued for retrenchment. While some of the regime’s security elite may welcome that, ordinary Iranians have repeatedly rejected his isolationist views. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which he could win a majority of votes in either the three-way race or the runoff election. While his supporters may welcome his presidency for ideological reasons, his victory would signal the Iranian people’s abandonment.
Qalibaf, who headed the crackdown on protesters as Iran’s police chief but was a popular mayor with national prominence, has offered a centrist vision of improving people’s quality of life through economic development while maintaining tight authoritarian control over society, with negotiations with the West as a necessary evil to achieve that goal.
So, most likely, this will be a fight between Pezechkian and Qalibakh. The establishment would prefer a high turnout in terms of legitimacy and a runoff between the two. After all, neither of them is a mortal threat, so it doesn’t matter who wins. And paradoxically, if the hardliner wins, it would signal that the regime is probably at its lowest point in history.
