At a recent press conference, US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, standing shoulder to shoulder with the NATO Secretary General, expressed a comprehensive vision: “The Alliance recognizes that security challenges in one part of the world affect others and vice versa,” Blinken said. He quoted Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida: “What happens in Ukraine today may happen in East Asia tomorrow.” The meaning behind this was clear: the US expects Europe to join in the campaign against the rise of China, just as its allies rallied against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
But while the transatlantic show of solidarity is moving, it obscures a more complex picture: Europe currently lacks both the military means and the political will to meaningfully support the United States in balancing China in Asia.
The major European armies Naval patrol In the Indo-Pacific, Europe’s militaries are undersized, ill-equipped and inadequate to sustain expeditionary missions due to decades of underinvestment. Germany, the continent’s largest economy, approved Half of the tanks could break down. Britain, once a world power, exhaust After two months of fierce fighting, the French army was depleted of ammunition. Shrunk During the Cold War, there were 15 divisions; today there are just two.
“Sending a frigate or two on patrol is one thing, but maintaining a significant presence to deter Chinese aggression is quite another. The strategic transportation, logistics, and basing required to maintain forces in the Pacific would be enormously expensive. Most of NATO’s European allies would have a hard time even defending themselves against a determined Russian attack, much less projecting power in Asia.”
Political will is even more scarce. A recent study by the Institute for Global Affairs found that: carried out We found that in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France (the four wealthiest North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries), Europeans are much less likely than Americans to see China as a threat, to hold strongly negative opinions of China, or to believe the West should prepare for a new Cold War. These sentiments limit the extent to which their leaders will lean toward Washington on China, despite their uplifting rhetoric at summits. Once they’re done defending democracy at international summits, these political leaders return to their democracies, where their policies are determined and constrained by the preferences of their voters.
If Washington pressures European countries to join the campaign to limit China’s power and influence, the United States may once again alienate its most important ally. Confronting China as a convivial band of democracies may be emotionally satisfying, but it is unwise in the long run. Europe is already disillusioned by its involvement in endless wars since September 11 and is wary of America’s tendency toward military intervention. President Biden should be careful not to drag Europe into a broader global conflict that it does not want and cannot contribute to.
These military and political differences are also accompanied by disputes over trade and technology. For example, the U.S. Anti-Inflation Act and the proposed European Union carbon border tax are creating tensions. Economic disagreements pale in comparison to the overriding challenge of deterring Chinese or Russian aggression against Taiwan or NATO territory, but all these factors suggest that the U.S. and Europe should diverge their attention. The U.S. should concentrate its forces in the Pacific while encouraging Europe to strengthen its defenses closer to home. European allies should focus on deterring Moscow, rather than weakening efforts in faraway regions where they can make little difference.
Over time, a stronger European defense posture could lead to even greater contributions to the Pacific. But developing the necessary expeditionary capabilities would require significant investments in areas such as airlift and maritime transport that most European militaries have long neglected. If Europe focused on securing its own neighborhood, it would free the United States from expensive burdens there and allow it to focus more on the Indo-Pacific. This approach is also politically popular, with our survey showing that a majority of Europeans want to increase their own defense spending. Nearly nine in 10 Europeans want Europe to take primary or total responsibility for its own defense.
For all the passionate calls for free world unity, the reality is that Europe cannot be America’s wingman in Asia — at least not anytime soon. The world’s leading democracies may share many values, but their interests and capabilities differ across geographies. Effectively managing an authoritarian challenger like China requires a division of labor among allies, not a pretense of coordinated cooperation. As NATO member states gather in Washington this week, expect less optimistic idealism about what the world could be and more careful realism about the way it is.
Mark Hanna, Senior Researcher Institute of Global AffairsLead author the “New Atlanticism” Report And the host “none of the above”Podcast. Professor Hanna
