The rest of the world is not rallying to America’s side either. Most have criticized not only Russia’s aggression but also the Western response, condemning both houses of Congress. Biden has made things worse. By describing the conflict as a “battle between democracy and authoritarianism” and making little visible effort to seek peace through diplomacy, he appears to be asking others to join him in the never-ending struggle. Few countries outside of US allies have imposed sanctions on Russia. Isolating China would be an even tougher task if it were to attack Taiwan. In Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, perceptions of Russia and China have actually improved since 2022.
The Gaza war couldn’t have come at a worse time, and Biden responded by plunging into the disaster. Rather than making U.S. aid conditional on Israel finding a strategy to protect civilians, he immediately pledged his support for Israel’s relentless military campaign. Choosing to follow rather than lead, Biden could only condemn Israel’s actions as a bystander of his own choosing. In a decisive conflict, the United States could play both weakness and repression. The cost to America’s reputation and security is only just beginning to emerge.
More recently, the US has tried to broker terms acceptable to both Israel and Palestine, using diplomacy to halt Iran’s nuclear program and encouraging Saudi Arabia to, in the words of Barack Obama, “share the neighborhood” with Iran’s rival. At this point, the Biden administration seems to want little more than to solidify its anti-Iranian camp. It is seeking to commit US forces to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in a treaty in return for Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel. If this deal goes through, there is a slim chance it will bring peace and stability to the Middle East, but a big chance it will further embroil the US in regional violence.
Part of the problem is the president’s tendency to over-identify with U.S. partners. He has deferred to Ukraine on whether to pursue peace talks and avoided contradicting its maximal war aims. He has rushed to provide aid to Israel even as he openly questioned its war plans. Biden has also pledged to defend Taiwan four times, going beyond an official U.S. pledge to arm Taiwan but not necessarily fight for it. His predecessors were not always so one-sided, for example maintaining “strategic ambiguity” on whether the U.S. would go to war over Taiwan.
But Biden’s instincts reflect a deeper error that has been building up for decades. Coming out of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers confused global leadership with military superiority. The United States certainly had both: it could safely expand its military power without encountering lethal resistance from major powers. “The world is no longer divided into two hostile camps,” Bill Clinton declared in 1997. That same year, he argued for NATO’s eastward expansion. “Instead, we are forging bonds with nations that were once our enemies.”
