Good news: The IDF announced that it has gained operational control of the Philadelphia Corridor. During the takeover, 20 tunnels crossing from Egypt to the Gaza Strip and 82 underground shafts near the corridor were discovered, which will be inspected in the coming days.
It also found that Hamas had fired dozens of rockets, including long-range ones, just 10 to 40 meters from the corridor, with the intention of preventing Israeli attacks from too close to the Egyptian border.
Some may disagree with me, but in my opinion, this was Israel’s first significant strategic achievement in the war, and it is a pity that our operational planners did not try to achieve this at the start of the ground operations.
This also marked a strategic turning point in the Gaza operation: it can be said without exaggeration that the Philadelphia Corridor was Hamas’ “strategic hinterland,” “city of refuge,” “granary,” and the central base of anything called the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip.
Occupying the entire corridor, except for the small additions still needed along the Mediterranean coast, would be a move as much psychological as physical, with far-reaching implications for Hamas’ survival, the war effort, and Egypt’s role.
For Hamas, as long as the corridor remains functional, it and the areas adjacent to it will serve as the organization’s “strategic hinterland,” a kind of refuge city.
For Hamas, it was clear that the war would end with them wounded and geographically reduced, but surviving in areas the IDF would not move in. If Hamas’ efforts to stop the war were successful, it would undoubtedly enable them to obtain supplies of arms and ammunition to continue the war and restore their military strength.
At the same time, much of the civilian goods coming through this corridor arrived via the highway as humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, thus giving Hamas time and space to control its own supplies in the tunnels. And we already know that money was not a factor.
Now the “tap has been turned off.” It will take some time, but we will see Hamas pressure increase, gradually at first, and then exponentially.
An aggressive “arms economy” would be revitalized, which would likely bring Hamas much closer to dismantling its government control than any recoverable military action, and could also pave the way for new hostage deals under improved terms.
Relations with Egypt
For many years, Egypt has had to play three roles, especially during times of war.
Its first role is officially that of a border state with official means of pressure against Hamas (the Rafah checkpoint), an ally of Israel and the US, and a partner of Israel in its regional strategic vision and policy towards Gaza.
Officially, its second role is that of an “objective” intermediary in negotiating efforts with Hamas and a “natural” partner in trying to define “the future ahead”.
The third role is unofficially under Israel’s nose, enabling an entire smuggling industry of tunnels from Israeli territory into the territory of the Gaza Strip, in effect becoming the organization’s “oxygen pipe” and the main source of illegal weapons, ammunition and prohibited substances that enabled the establishment of “Deep Gaza”.
Of note was the existence of an elevated road between Egypt and Gaza: the Salah al-Din crossing, which was used to move goods from Egypt to the Gaza Strip without Israeli or international oversight, but which was not widely advertised and operated in addition to the well-known Rafah crossing.
Apparently, the tunnel/goods/crossing economy and the industries that developed on Egyptian territory contributed considerably to the tranquility that Egypt sought to maintain in the Sinai, and therefore Egypt had an interest in not abolishing it, as it knew how to do so in many other cases.
Now, the IDF has broken the silence of the Philadelphia Corridor, retaking control of the Gaza side while also publicly exposing its actions in the corridor over the years and Egypt’s responsibility on the other side of the border, as well as its actual contribution (even if it was a passive contribution without any willingness to act) to Hamas’ power and status.
Perhaps this is also the reason for Egypt’s strong opposition to the Israeli operation in Rafah in recent weeks.
What next?
As for the “day after,” Israeli control of the corridor would mark the first step in its ability to separate the Gaza Strip from the IDF and establish Israeli security control in the Gaza Strip.
This is a strategic lever of the first order, which puts Israel in a significantly improved and different position in the discussions that will take place “tomorrow” and on the role of private and international organizations, including Egypt’s role as an important ally of Israel and its demands as a neighbor within the framework of a written agreement supported by the United States and the international community, which for some reason have refrained so far from mentioning Egypt in relation to Gaza and from pressuring Egypt to close the “oxygen pipeline” to Hamas that passes through Egyptian territory.
At the same time, the military effort and the IDF occupation of the Philadelphia Corridor cannot be undertaken in isolation and must now be undertaken in parallel and joint efforts.
First, to photograph and show, primarily to the United States and the world, what the Philadelphia Corridor looks like: the tunnel leading from Egypt into the Gaza Strip and the “silent” Salah al-Din border crossing as a unique and essential part of Israel’s continued security control of the route, and from Gaza on the other side.
The closure of the corridor will undoubtedly force Hamas to “conserve its forces” and, over time, limit its ability to return fire.
It is precisely at this point that it becomes crucial to push the foot of his governance, revitalize civilian activity in the northern Gaza Strip, and take responsibility for distributing humanitarian aid and creating a humanitarian bubble in which Hamas is no longer involved.
This strategic turning point in the war in Gaza is significant, and will allow Israel for the first time to begin to focus its time, attention and resources on other fronts.
Lt. Col. Amit Yeager (ret.) is Deputy Director for Palestinian Affairs in the Israel Defense Forces’ Plans Department and a former senior officer in Naval Intelligence.
