Despite, or perhaps because of, the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, diplomatic negotiations continue with the aim of pursuing an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement. The basic motivations of the United States and Saudi Arabia in this context remain the same as they were before October 7.
Normalization would lead to the establishment of a regional security alliance and a reversal of the negative strategic trends for Israel since October 7. A moderate alliance would counter Iran and the resistance bloc, open the door to the participation of the Palestinian Authority, establish an alternative governance to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and revamp the political process in the arena of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The US wants to forge a new regional order that will make it easier for it and other Middle Eastern countries to deal with Iran. It also wants to show that it is not abandoning the region. Riyadh wants to strengthen its regional position, especially vis-Ã -vis Iran, and enhance its status and security by strengthening its ties and defense alliance with Washington.
Moreover, the war that has raged on several fronts since October 7 has made it clear to the Saudi royal family that the Palestinian issue is not secondary and cannot be contained or ignored. Thus, as long as the war in Gaza continues, Saudi Arabia distances itself from being identified with Israel and shows solidarity with the Palestinians. Thus, Saudi Arabia is increasing the price it demands from Israel in terms of a commitment with practical steps to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the framework of a two-state reality.
As a result of the conflict, Israel’s “normalization price” on the Palestinian issue has increased, and the Israeli government is refusing to pay it. Saudi Arabia is now being asked to get involved in the Palestinian issue, to help stabilize and rebuild the Gaza Strip, and to respond to growing public opposition to Israel in Arab countries since the outbreak of the war. More than 90% of the Saudis are opposed to normalization with Israel, and the gap between the government’s policies and the public’s opinions is widening.
Even if Arab states’ motivations for peace with Israel remain the same, these regimes’ cost-benefit thinking has changed. From their perspective, Israel has failed to crush Hamas, which they despise, and the scenes of death and destruction in the Gaza Strip pose a threat to their own security. They also fear that the conflict could escalate into a larger regional war involving Iran and its proxies.
Tainted by the Gaza War
But Saudi Arabia, like other pragmatic countries, has been reluctant to get directly involved in pushing for a deal to end the war in Gaza and potentially require its active participation, such as joining a pan-Arab task force.
Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia have grown close enough to strengthen the partnership while reducing interest in Saudi-Israeli normalization. Removing the “burden” of normalization from the Kingdom would be an ideal scenario for Riyadh, allowing Saudi Arabia to reap the benefits from the United States without facing the public backlash that would come with normalization with Israel.
But as senior Saudi royal officials have stated publicly, Saudi Arabia is aligned with the United States and appears to be leaving the door open to normalizing relations.
It would be a disaster for Israel’s interests if Washington and Riyadh were to strengthen ties without incorporating elements of normalization: Jerusalem would miss out on an opportunity for normalization with the Arab and Islamic world, establishing a regional security alliance, and the potential strategic advantages that come with it, while paying a heavy price for Saudi Arabia’s strategic gains from the United States.
Israeli leaders should recognize the strategic costs of not responding to U.S. and Saudi proposals, including a Palestinian package and an open window to an Israeli-Palestinian political process.
On the other hand, participating in normalization and becoming part of a regional security alliance would be a powerful counterweight to Hamas and Iran, which have sought to sabotage the process of reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world. Moreover, normalization would facilitate an agreement to end the conflict, with active Arab participation in the stabilization and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, even if it involves the new Palestinian Authority.
An Israeli-Saudi Arabian normalization deal would bring economic benefits, enhance Israel’s legitimacy in the Arab and Islamic world, strengthen America’s position in the region, and increase Saudi Arabia’s political and military power as a counterweight to Iran.
Ultimately, Israel needs to seize this golden, and perhaps unique, opportunity by addressing Saudi concerns and pursuing an end to the war, including finalizing an agreement to release the hostages, removing Hamas’ veto power so that it cannot disrupt a positive process on the Palestinian issue, establishing a “renewed” moderate Palestinian administration to administer a demilitarized Gaza Strip while preserving the military freedom of the IDF, and defining a diplomatic perspective for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The authors are senior researchers at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University.
