There’s a Polish proverb that goes: “No one will die for Gdańsk.” Whatever security guarantees Poland gets from the West, most Poles believe they have to fend for themselves. After all, when the Nazis invaded in 1939, Poland received security guarantees from Britain and France, but neither country came to their aid (though they did formally declare war on the Third Reich).
Indeed, according to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an attack on one NATO member state is considered an attack on all, and Poland’s faith in this mutual defense commitment remains strong. The US president has repeatedly vowed to “defend every inch” of NATO territory. But in an era of hybrid warfare, the obligations implicit in Article 5 are becoming increasingly vague. Moreover, unlike Nazi Germany, the greatest threat to Europe today is armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons.
US and German leaders have not necessarily boosted confidence in NATO security by constantly suggesting that an escalation in the Ukrainian war is one of their biggest concerns. For example, it is unclear how they would respond if Russia invaded Estonia, especially at a time when Europe’s armies and arms industries are so weak. Poland itself has sent more tanks to Ukraine than the UK.
Opinion: Estonia takes the lead in using frozen Russian assets
The Estonian parliament passed a law on May 15 allowing frozen Russian assets to be used to compensate Ukraine for Russian war damages. Kiev and its Western allies have been in talks about using about $300 billion in Russian assets held in Western accounts to help Ukraine.
In this situation, Poland and the Baltic states decided to not only arm themselves, but also to devote considerable resources to building fortifications along their borders with Russia, Belarus, and (partially) Ukraine. In Poland, the plan is officially called “Eastern Shield”, but it has already become known as the “Tusk Line”, named after the current Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the famous French Maginot Line from WWII.
The Polish government has allocated 10 billion zlotys ($2.6 billion) to the project, which is due to be completed by 2028. However, this amount is likely to be insufficient: the border fence with Belarus alone (built by the previous government) cost 1.6 billion zlotys ($404 million) and has often failed to stop the influx of migrants that Russia and Belarus have imposed on Poland in recent years.
Nevertheless, what is important is that the Polish people are ready to make large economic sacrifices for the defense of their country. Moreover, Poland expects support from the European Union, which is increasingly aware of the Russian threat. Poland’s border with Russia and Belarus is also the eastern border of the European Union, so it makes sense that it should be protected by joint European efforts. Poland’s previous illiberal government refused to join the German-led “Iron Dome” initiative due to irrational Germanophobia, but the Tusk government has recently corrected this strategic error.
Poland and the Baltic states are in a slightly different strategic position than Finland. Finland boasts not only an excellent army, well-trained citizens, a huge number of bomb shelters, but most importantly, a vast area of sparsely populated and densely wooded land that would complicate things for an invader. Thus, Finland assumes that it can mount an effective defense even if it lets an enemy into its country. Success or failure has nothing to do with the security of its borders.
In contrast, the Baltic states recently decided that they needed a series of linked fortifications along their eastern border, a so-called “Baltic Defense Line,” to prevent invading forces from advancing too deep into their territories. Under a recently agreed joint plan, the Baltic governments will build about 600 fortified bunkers in Estonia alone, at a cost of about $64 million, and set up 18 “anti-mobility parks,” or rapid-deployment sites for anti-personnel and anti-vehicle weapons (such as tank traps), in Lithuania.
Poland’s Tusk Line will have a similar structure, but with an emphasis on creating 700 kilometers (434 miles) of natural guardrail. “The main priority is to improve the transport infrastructure, which is sorely lacking on our eastern border,” said General Mieczysław Bieniek, an adviser to Poland’s Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak. “Fortifications, bunkers and shelters alone will not stop anyone. We need to be able to cover these areas with firing positions and troops to ensure the security of our border.”
Opinion: Is the Russian nuclear scare a big deal?
Since Russia launched a full-scale invasion in 2022, the Kremlin has been trying to play the nuclear card to intimidate Ukraine and block Western support. Kiev and its partners cannot ignore Moscow’s nuclear threat, but they should understand that the Russian leadership cannot.
Swamps, floodplains, dams, dense forests and other natural barriers will need to be fully utilized and new ones built so that Polish forces can set up safe and effective firing positions, plan ambushes, organize supply centers and be prepared to lure enemy forces into vulnerable positions. Poland will also rely heavily on counter-drone defenses, satellite and aerial reconnaissance. To this end, Poland recently deployed US reconnaissance aerostat technology (a US program code-named “Barbara”), which can detect targets hundreds of kilometers away.
The eastern defense plans of Finland, the Baltic states and Poland are seemingly different but have the same fundamental goals and are compatible, and are being developed in close consultation with EU leaders in Brussels, where efforts are underway to create a new joint defense commissioner position to coordinate and reorganize Europe’s military industry.
However, no plan or border defense belt can protect the EU’s security without adequately supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia. If Russian forces overrun Ukraine, all plans for Poland, Finland and the Baltic states will be undone. The Baltic and Tusk lines will take years to build, so the Ukrainian battlefield remains the top priority.
Editor’s note: Opinions expressed in opinion columns are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Kyiv Independent.
Slawomir Sierakowski
Mercator Senior Researcher
