Al Ahram The newspaper recently reported that Egypt has provided tens of thousands of psychological support sessions to injured Palestinians since the start of the war in Gaza. This seemingly trivial news article is part of a comprehensive media and PR campaign to demonstrate Egypt’s commitment to the Palestinian cause.
Since October 7, Egypt has been the epicenter of the conflict. Egypt, which shares a border with Gaza since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005, has feared a mass exodus of Palestinians fleeing or being expelled across the border into the Sinai Peninsula. Such a scenario would pose a significant security and humanitarian threat to a country that already suffers from a large impoverished population and has just overcome the threat of Islamic State cells among the Bedouin in the Sinai Peninsula. Additionally, Egypt already hosts approximately 500,000 refugees, mostly from Sudan and Syria.
Egypt is also grappling with serious economic problems. Houthi attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have sharply reduced revenues from the Suez Canal, reduced tourism, reduced natural gas revenues, and increased poverty rates due to soaring prices. Ending the war is therefore a top priority for Egypt. But the conflict is also an opportunity for President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to restore Egypt’s leadership in the Arab world.
Since the war began, Egypt has spearheaded mediation efforts between Israel and Fatah in cooperation with Qatar. Egypt has played a mediating role in all previous wars and crises between Israel and Hamas since 2007, but its current involvement appears to be more widespread.
Egypt is leveraging several assets in its mediation efforts. First, it maintains direct relationships with both Israel and Hamas, allowing it to get its message across quickly and reliably. Second, the Egyptian General Intelligence Service has maintained a cooperative relationship with Hamas leadership for many years. Finally, Egypt’s relationship with the Biden administration constitutes a further asset. What Egypt lacks in financial and economic influence, Qatar makes up for with its own resources and strategic relationships.
But for Israel and the United States, Egypt is seen as a more reliable or “objective” intermediary. Egypt’s interests overlap with Israel’s in terms of weakening Hamas, but Egypt wants a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) established in Gaza, which Israel currently opposes. .
Egypt’s involvement extends beyond mediation. It plays an important role in transferring humanitarian aid to Gaza via the Rafah border. Egyptian media provides detailed reports on the number of aid trucks passing through, highlighting Egypt’s role in mitigating the humanitarian crisis. In addition, a limited number of injured Palestinians from Gaza are being treated in Cairo hospitals.
Egypt aims to end war and restore peace
Egyptian policy is aimed at ending the war and bringing peace to Gaza, preventing the influx of refugees, and stabilizing the economy. Moreover, Egypt wants to achieve two important gains in its foreign policy.
First, tech companies are seeking to strengthen their position as important and reliable allies to the Biden administration. This is especially important given the possibility that the United States could sign a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, which could elevate Saudi Arabia to the most important US ally in the region. Improving the position with the United States could also reduce American criticism and interference regarding the Sisi government’s human rights record.
The second potential dividend relates to Egypt’s position in the Arab world, which has declined in recent decades. The rapid pace of population growth, the relative scarcity of fossil fuel resources (other than natural gas), and the impact of the Arab Spring led Egypt to focus more on internal politics.
In contrast, oil and gas-rich countries in the Gulf region, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, have become major Arab states.
Leadership in the Arab world is also tied to the mediation of regional conflicts. This role holds particular prestige in Arab politics and in the context of the Palestinian issue, which is crucial to strengthening the legitimacy of national leaders. While the UAE focuses on providing humanitarian aid and Saudi Arabia pursues a defense deal with the United States (and possibly normalization with Israel), Egypt is deeply involved in mediation.
Egypt has presented Israel and Hamas with multiple proposals to end the war, the most important of which were proposed in December 2023 and April 2024.
Egypt, which had been confident in the latest deal, found that Hamas was changing the offer to suit its own interests. In response, Egypt has threatened to halt or delay the delivery of humanitarian aid through the Rafah border (controlled by Israel on the Palestinian side), threaten to degrade diplomatic relations, and express support for South Africa’s case in an international court. tried to force Israel’s hand. The Hague judge alleges genocide in Gaza.
Paradoxically, Egypt stands to benefit from almost any outcome. If Operation Rafah is thwarted and an agreement is reached, it will be largely a credit to Sisi, and Egypt’s prestige will increase. If Israel were to proceed with Operation Rafah and succeed in eliminating Hamas, it would also be in Egypt’s interests, although it has not said so publicly.
The real problem occurs when neither outcome materializes.
Although Israeli-Egyptian relations have so far managed to overcome many obstacles and challenges, Operation Rafah could be a turning point. From Egypt’s perspective, it risks forcing Palestinians to flee to its territory, exposing it to harsh criticism from Egyptian and Arab public opinion, and further destabilizing the region.
The failure of Egypt’s mediation proposal also damaged Arab efforts to reach a resolution to the conflict. Israel’s Operation Rafah risks becoming a “dune” in Israel-Egypt relations, straining the delicate balance that has maintained their cooperation to date.
The author teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a director of the Israeli Regional Foreign Policy Institute Mitvim.
