European Union Recent Decisions Impose provisional additional tariffs on Chinese products Electric car It is part of a series of safeguards adopted by countries and organisations challenging Beijing’s market distortions while waiting for the EU Commission’s anti-subsidy investigation, which is due to conclude in November.
The list is getting longer. In May, America It announced new tariffs on $18 billion worth of Chinese imports, including a 100% tariff on Chinese-made electric vehicle imports. Turkey and Brazil have put up their own trade barriers against Chinese-made electric vehicles. India said its auto market is “well protected” by high tariffs on electric vehicle imports, while Canada impose penalties Similar to the EU one.
China’s trade practices have also targeted other Southeast Asian countries, with Thailand considering anti-dumping measures against a host of Chinese products and Indonesia preparing to do the same against textile products.
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Why the EU and US are worried about Chinese excess capacity
Why the EU and US are worried about Chinese excess capacity
In some cases, Chinese automakers may be able to absorb the costs of new trade barriers or avoid imposed tariffs by building electric vehicles in a third country, but the risks are greater.
Regardless of the economic impact of higher tariffs, the expansion of anti-China trade protectionism underscores a disorderly trend in the international system: the United States and its Western allies are not the only countries targeting Chinese exports. Accusations of oversupply and dumpingalso known as Global SouthBeijing sees it as an alternative base to resist Washington’s containment policy.
Brazil BRICS GroupingFor more than a decade, the group’s members included China, Russia, India and South Africa until its recent expansion. Turkey North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationHowever, by joining the SCO as a dialogue partner, Thailand is strengthening its geopolitical ties with China, and is reportedly interested in joining BRICS. Thailand has also begun to move towards joining BRICS. Both Thailand and Indonesia are major BRICS economies. Association of Southeast Asian NationsIt is China’s largest export market.
Chinese President Xi Jinping is welcomed by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at Astana airport in Kazakhstan on July 2. Photo: Kazakhstan Presidential Press Office/Reuters
Every country wants to maximize its national interests, and this is true even in a multipolar world, which is why China’s partners in the Global South will defend China-dominated supply chains if they believe it is in their interest to do so.
Turkey and Thailand are good examples of China’s increasingly ambiguous trade relations with non-Western countries.
Turkey has imposed a 40% tariff on Chinese car imports, but Turkish electric vehicle manufacturer TOGG is reportedly interested in a joint production venture with Chinese automaker Guangzhou Automobile Group Co. It is also worth noting that the Turkish government is in negotiations with China about building a nuclear power plant.
Concerned about the impact of cheap Chinese products on Thai businesses, Bangkok has adopted a protectionist stance. BYD Chinese carmaker Renault said it would buy a 20 percent stake in Thai distributor River Automotive after opening its first factory in the country last week.
Workers work on an assembly line at BYD’s new factory in Nikhom Pattana, Thailand, on July 4. Photo: Bloomberg
Overall, the international system may be more multipolar than it was a few years ago, but it remains highly fluid. Moreover, while China has attempted to build trade dependencies through its global transportation and infrastructure projects, this has not translated into automatic political alignment among BRI participants.
China’s rival, the United States, is not exempt from these constraints either. Washington Strengthening technical cooperation China cooperates closely with Japan and South Korea, but the two key East Asian allies have so far been reluctant to follow Washington’s lead in raising tariffs on Chinese products or blocking China’s acquisition of high-end technology.
But there are differences between the two great powers. Beijing’s aversion to formal alliances does not help its efforts to prevent possible forms of decoupling or risk aversion with its trading partners. Sponsored by the United StatesThe aims of the are to protect member states from external threats, but it also has the political objective of easing potential and actual tensions and resolving differences between allies.
Emanuele Simia is an independent journalist and foreign affairs analyst.
